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In the months immediately preceding and following the publication of
Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed in the autumn of 2008, I
gave a number of lectures on the topic of the book at universities in the
United States. The lectures in most cases were an expanded version of the
introduction to the book, briefly tracing the history of the conjunction of
Buddhism and science and demonstrating, or attempting to demonstrate,
that claims for the compatibility of Buddhism and science derive from the
colonial encounter, and specifically from polemics between Buddhist elites
and critics of Buddhism, whether they were Christian missionaries or Asian
modernists. I would observe that such claims have required a serious de-
limiting, and at times even distortion, of what “Buddhism,” whether un-
derstood doctrinally or historically, might mean. The lecture would conclude
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with the question of why such claims for the compatibility of Buddhism
and science have continued to persist after the colonial period.
Following one such lecture at a university in California, the first person
to raise his hand asked, “Could you comment on the relationship between
quantum mechanics and the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness?” It seemed
that this person had not heard what I had said over the previous fifty min-
utes, or, more likely, found what I had said to be irrelevant to the interests
that had motivated him to attend a lecture on Buddhism and science. I
had failed to make my most basic point clear to at least one member of the
audience, and he seemed puzzled when I failed to answer his question
directly. The second question came from a prominent scholar of Buddhism,
who asked, “Can you name a single scholar of Buddhism who takes the
claims about Buddhism and science seriously?” This question also was tell-
ing. Unlike the first questioner, the second had understood everything that
I had said all too well; what I had said was so obvious that it need not be
discussed. His question implied a second question, directed specifically to
me, which he was too polite to state directly: “Why would you, a scholar
of Buddhism, waste your time writing a book about Buddhism and sci-
ence when all scholars of Buddhism know that all claims for the compat-
ibility of Buddhism and science are nonsense?” In other words, both of my
interlocutors were perplexed.
When I first submitted the manuscript to the University of Chicago
Press, the book was titled Buddhism and Science: A Historical Critique. The
subtitle seemed to me a clear description of what the book sought to be,
and it distinguished it clearly from several other books titled Buddhism
and Science. However, the press felt that the subtitle was somewhat boring
and asked me to suggest something else. I eventually settled on “A Guide
for the Perplexed.” This subtitle was not randomly chosen and was not
intended merely as a brazen evocation of the great Maimonides.
At the University of Michigan, I currently serve as chair of the Michi-
gan Society of Fellows, and in that capacity it is my good fortune to speak
with faculty from the natural sciences more often than would normally be
the case for a scholar from the humanities. In the inevitable September
small talk that academics exchange after the summer, one is always asked,
“What were you working on this summer?” The past few years I have an-
swered, “I am writing a book on Buddhism and science.” And each time I
have spoken that simple sentence to a scientist, he or she has looked per-
plexed. When one has written a book on a particular topic, one hopes that
its title will spark a hint of recognition in most scholars and that those who
are oblivious to the topic will at least be able to employ the academic’s
well-developed ability to mask confusion with the knowing nod of the
head. But in the case of a book on Buddhism and science, the confusion
was clearly evident.
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This perplexity has been instructive. Buddhism and science has been
something of a hot topic in large circles of Western Buddhism for more
than a decade, and interest in it has only increased in recent years. Thus, it
has been humbling to utter those three words in conversations with scien-
tists and be met with unabashed expressions of bafflement. This, then, is
one level of perplexity referenced by the subtitle: a general perplexity at the
conjunction of the terms Buddhism and science—hearing the words but
not knowing what they mean.
There is a second type of perplexity, a more skeptical one: a puzzlement
as to why the two words would be conjoined. This type of perplexity I
myself once suffered. For many years I imagined that claims for the com-
patibility of Buddhism and science derived—like so many other popular
conceptions, and misconceptions, about Buddhism—from the 60s and
had come to their first popular expression in Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of
Physics, published by Shambhala in 1975. I was both right and wrong. The
claims did derive from the 60s, but I was off by a century. The claims are
made as early as the 1870s.
Identifying the historical origins of a claim is the first step toward un-
derstanding that claim. Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed
was an effort to remove my own perplexity by seeking to identify the his-
torical origins of claims for the compatibility of Buddhism and science. As
I hope the book establishes, these claims began in the nineteenth century,
in conjunction with several factors crucial to their appearance. First, it was
during the nineteenth century that Buddhism became fashionable in Eu-
rope. Second, it was also during the nineteenth century that Buddhist leaders
in a number of Asian cultures sought to defend themselves against the
attacks of Christian missionaries.
I began these comments with the observation that, at least in my public
presentations of the general outlines of the book, it has not immediately
succeeded in finding its audience. For those who have a personal or profes-
sional investment in the idea that Buddhism and science are somehow
compatible, my historical critique has been unconvincing. For many pro-
fessional scholars of Buddhism, who know Buddhist doctrine and history
well, the idea that Buddhism and science (whatever one means by those
terms) are compatible is so preposterous as to be unworthy of sustained
analysis, and certainly unworthy to be the topic of an entire monograph.
Thus, I am grateful to Zygon for undertaking the difficult task of find-
ing readers who fall into neither of these two categories—the unconvinced
enthusiast and the uninterested Buddhologist—readers who would take
the time to seriously engage with the content of my book, and I am grate-
ful that they succeeded so admirably in their task. The original plan was to
have responses from three scholars. The first response would be from a
historian of religion-and-science who does not focus specifically on Bud-
dhism in his or her work. The second would be from a scholar of Buddhism
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who is currently involved in conversations on Buddhism and neuroscience.
The third would be from a scholar of Buddhism who would bring a broad
comparative perspective from outside the traditions of Indian Buddhism
and Tibetan Buddhism, with which I am most familiar. However, only the
first two responses appear here. The third was to be provided by William
LaFleur, who died unexpectedly on February 26, 2010. Professor LaFleur
was an eminent scholar of Japanese Buddhism who, in the last stage of his
career, examined a meeting ground of Buddhism and science that few oth-
ers have explored: Buddhism and medical science, especially around ques-
tions of brain death and organ transplant. I am honored that Professor
LaFleur consented to offer a response and, together with all scholars in the
field of Buddhist Studies, deeply regret his passing.
Zygon was able to persuade two distinguished scholars to fill the other
two roles: historian of religion-and-science Peter Harrison and scholar of
Buddhist philosophy Thupten Jinpa. I comment on each of their responses
below. However, it is presumptuous to assume that all readers of this issue
of Zygon have read Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed, so I
begin with a brief summary in order to provide some context for the com-
ments that follow.
OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE BOOK
The longish introduction presents an overview of the history of the claim
that Buddhism and science are compatible, beginning in the nineteenth
century with lectures by Ernst Johann Eitel of the London Missionary
Society, delivered in Hong Kong in 1870–71, and the Panadure Debate
between a Buddhist monk and a Methodist minister that took place in Sri
Lanka in 1873. This survey continues through the nineteenth century, as
Chinese monks responded to condemnations of Buddhism as superstition
by Chinese modernists, and as Japanese priests responded to restrictions
on Buddhism by the new Meiji government. One of the Japanese repre-
sentatives to the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, a
Zen priest, delivered a lecture not on koans or zazen but on the compatibil-
ity of Buddhism and science. In the twentieth century, the chief Buddhist
interlocutor of science shifted from the Theravada Buddhism of Sri Lanka
and Southeast Asia, to the Zen of D. T. Suzuki, to Tibetan Buddhism and
its spokesperson, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, who remains the leading
Buddhist voice in the conversation.
The first chapter deals with what, strangely, is one of the most persistent
questions in the discourse of Buddhism and science: the status of Mount
Meru, the axis mundi that stands at the center of the traditional (and flat)
Buddhist world. With the great advances made in cartography in the nine-
teenth century, Mount Meru, and particularly the failure of any European
geographer to find it, became a common element of Christian missionar-
Donald S. Lopez Jr. 887
ies’ denunciations of Buddhism as a form of superstition. If the reputedly
omniscient Buddha was wrong about Mount Meru, as he surely was, he
could be wrong about everything. Various Buddhist responses have been
offered by Buddhist figures over the past century and a half. Some have
continued to argue that Mount Meru, said to be located to the north of
our continent of Jambudvipa, in fact exists; otherwise, why do compasses
always point north? Others have relegated it to the Buddha’s provisional
teachings, made in accordance with the intellectual capacity of his audi-
ence. The current Dalai Lama has said that the entire traditional cosmol-
ogy (which he ascribes to the fourth-century scholar Vasubandhu rather
than to the Buddha himself ) is simply wrong and may safely be aban-
doned by Buddhists.
Whether or not Mount Meru exists is at first sight a quaint question,
similar to the question of the status of Mount Olympus. But the religion
of the ancient Greeks is something that we consign today to the category
of mythology, while Buddhism remains, for want of a better term, a “living
religion.” Various gods are said to live on the slopes and summit of Mount
Meru, and their existence has thus far not been explicitly rejected. In addi-
tion, the Buddha is said to have delivered some of his most significant
philosophical teachings, the abhidharma, to an audience of gods on Mount
Meru. Thus, its existence, an important component of the Buddhist world-
view that is clearly denied by modern science, is not inconsequential, in
part because it raises the question of where to place the dividing line that
some Buddhist thinkers draw between what is “cultural,” that is, histori-
cally contingent and thus able to be jettisoned without doing damage to
Buddhism, and what is “essential,” that is, of eternal and universal signifi-
cance and hence crucial to the identity of Buddhism, however defined.
The second chapter deals with Buddhism and the science of race. In the
nineteenth century, and continuing to the present day, the Buddha often
has been portrayed as a social reformer, welcoming members of all castes,
and outcastes, into his order of monks, declaring that all are equally ca-
pable of achieving enlightenment. In such descriptions, the stance of the
Buddha with regard to caste is contrasted with that of the Brahmins, the
priests who jealously guarded their knowledge and banned the lower strata
of Indian society from access to it. Although the Buddha did admit mem-
bers of the lower castes into the order, he was a critic not of the caste
system per se but rather of the claims to superiority of the Brahmins, who,
it is important to note, were his chief competitors for alms and patronage.
In fact, the European portrayal of the Buddha as a lay egalitarian in con-
flict with a corrupt priesthood served as a surrogate form of the anti–Ro-
man Catholicism that ran strongly through much of the intellectual
discourse of the day; some called the Buddha the “Luther of Asia.”
It was during this period in the late nineteenth century that race science
came to the fore. The Buddha was Aryan, noble both in blood and in spirit,
888 Zygon
qualities that made him all the more appealing to a Europe struggling with
the implications of the fact that Jesus was a Semite. Certain Buddhist elites
in Asia, most notably the Sinhalese activist Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–
1933), used the language of race science to proclaim the superiority of the
Aryan Buddha over the Semite Jesus in statements that are profoundly
disquieting with the knowledge of the consequences of race science in the
decade after Dharmapala’s death. Some readers of my book have ques-
tioned the suitability of including a chapter on Buddhism’s implication in
the race science of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since
race science is not real science. But elevating racism to the status of science
had clear, and devastating, consequences for millions around the world,
and Buddhism, so often seen as unsullied by such things, was not immune
to its taint. The story also serves as a cautionary tale of how things that
fairly recently had the imprimatur of “science” eventually can be shown to
be yet another, and in this case deadly, manifestation of ignorance.
Because Tibet remained largely free of direct European influence, in-
cluding the presence of long-standing Christian missions, the discourse of
Buddhism and science so prominent in Sri Lanka, China, and Japan did
not play a significant role in Tibet during the nineteenth century. It is only
in the twentieth century—and especially after Tibet came under Chinese
control and the Dalai Lama went into exile in 1959—that the discourse of
Buddhism and science emerged in Tibetan Buddhism. The third chapter
deals with the two most important Tibetan participants in that discourse,
the renegade scholar Gendun Chophel (190–1951), who spent 1934–46
in South Asia, and the current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (1935–). Par-
ticular attention is devoted to the Dalai Lama, the most prominent Bud-
dhist figure to become deeply engaged in the topic of Buddhism and science;
his views are set forth most extensively in his 2005 book, The Universe in a
Single Atom.
The fourth chapter looks at the development of the “scientific” study of
Buddhism in the West, that is, the rise of the field of Buddhist Studies in
Europe, largely from roots in what once was called Oriental philology. I
focus particularly on the importance of Eugène Burnouf ’s Introduction à
l’histoire du Buddhisme indien, published in Paris in 1844, the founding
text for the academic study of Buddhism in the West. Of specific impor-
tance for the history of Buddhism and science is that this work portrays
what Burnouf calls the “human character of Buddhism,” one in which the
Buddha is a man who perfects himself through his own efforts and who
sets forth an ethical philosophy that is free of both metaphysics and ritual.
It was this demythologized Buddha, created by Burnouf, who could then
be portrayed as a kind of protorationalist, whose clear-eyed vision some-
how foresaw the discoveries of European science. My claim is that the dis-
course of Buddhism and science could not have occurred if European
scholars had not painted their own portrait of the Buddha.
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The final chapter deals, rather briefly, with the newest phase in the his-
tory of Buddhism and science, the recent research by neuroscientists on
the effects of meditation on the brain. Research in this area is in its early
stages, conducted in many cases by neuroscientists who themselves are prac-
ticing Buddhists, and what the fMRI results mean remains to be deter-
mined. This research offers something of a different turn in the discourse
of Buddhism and science because it rests not simply on similarities, often
vaguely perceived, between a specific scientific theory and a particular
Buddhist doctrine, but rather on an empirical investigation into a central
Buddhist practice. But the topic of Buddhist meditation is vast and com-
plex, difficult to understand without some knowledge of both the history
and the doctrine that underlie any particular form of it. Thus, in this chap-
ter I urge caution about some of the larger issues at stake.
Above all, my book is intended as a history of the idea that Buddhism
and science are compatible. As such, it does not have an explicit argumen-
tative thesis. It does have an implied one. It shows that claims for the
compatibility of Buddhism and science have been made in surprisingly
consistent rhetorical forms over the course of more than a century and a
half, years in which huge advances have occurred in the natural sciences.
What is understood by “Buddhism” also has changed considerably over
the period. That the claim has remained the same while the meaning of the
two nouns—Buddhism, science—has changed so greatly raises a simple ques-
tion that should give us pause: If Buddhism (however this abstract noun is
understood) was compatible with the science of the nineteenth century,
how can it also be compatible with the science of the twenty-first? Perhaps
it never was, and perhaps it is not now. The more interesting question is
why the claim continues to be made.
RESPONSE TO PETER HARRISON
Harrison is one of the foremost historians of religion-and-science. His books,
which include “Religion” and the Religions in the English Enlightenment
(1990), The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (2001),
and his recent The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (2009), to-
gether demonstrate, with rich historical detail and incisive reading of sources,
that the eternal battle between science and religion, at least in those terms,
is of very recent vintage, beginning, like so many other things, in the nine-
teenth century. This insight is essential for understanding the topic of Bud-
dhism and science for at least two reasons.
First, when one reads missionary attacks on Buddhism, from Francis
Xavier in Japan in the sixteenth century to Spence Hardy in Sri Lanka in
the nineteenth century, Christianity is proclaimed as superior to Buddhism
in part because it possesses the scientific knowledge to accurately describe
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the world. Thus, for the missionaries, science was not an opponent of reli-
gion, or at least of the true religion, but its ally. The efforts by Buddhist
elites to counter this claim and to argue that, on the contrary, Buddhism is
the truly scientific religion (an argument that they seem to have eventually
won) was directly precipitated by the Christian attacks. In a sense, the
Buddhists wrested the weapon of science from the hands of the Christians
and turned it against them.
Second, Harrison’s demonstration that science and religion began to be
portrayed as opponents only in the late nineteenth century suggests that
the elevation of Buddhism as the religion (if it is a religion) most compat-
ible with science during that same period is not coincidental. As he notes,
Buddhism came to be portrayed as a kind of negative image of Christian-
ity. Thus, Christianity has a creator God, Buddhism has no God; Chris-
tianity has faith, Buddhism has reason; Christianity has dogma, Buddhism
has philosophy; Christianity (at least certain kinds) has public ritual, Bud-
dhism has private reflection; Christianity has sin, Buddhism has karma;
Christianity has prayer, Buddhism has meditation; Christ is divine, the
Buddha is human. One could extend the list almost indefinitely.
Some have even gone so far as to declare that Buddhism is not a religion
at all; it is a science. As Harrison explains, the implications of such a state-
ment become evident in light of Victorian theories of social evolution (a
historicism that continues to live on in some quarters, as he notes), which
saw the human race progressing from the state of primitive superstition, to
religion, and then to science. As a science, Buddhism, condemned as a
primitive superstition by both European missionaries and Asian modern-
ists, can leap from the bottom of the evolutionary scale to the top, bypass-
ing the troublesome category of religion altogether.
Harrison has astutely demonstrated in his work that the category of
religion has, since the nineteenth century, been increasingly defined by its
relationship to science, suggesting that as religions have sought some mea-
sure of validation by science, they also have opened themselves to invalida-
tion by scientific critique. He further argues that in defining themselves in
this way religions have delimited the set of terms by which they may be
understood. This is a point, although stated less clearly than by Harrison,
that I try to make in the case of Buddhism. He, however, suggests that it
also has been the case for other religions, each with its specific history. This
is a larger project that historians of science and religion and historians of
specific religious traditions might fruitfully pursue together.
The flaws of a book often are least visible to the author, and I have no
doubt that Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed has many flaws.
Harrison, in the most polite terms, pinpoints one of which I am aware at
the beginning and at the end of his response. This is my failure to address
in any substantial way the issue of the historical versus the normative. The
book is largely historical, but my own view of the question of the compat-
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ibility of Buddhism and science is not difficult to discern. Direct state-
ments of that view are relatively rare in the book. Yet the significant space
afforded to descriptions of key Buddhist doctrines that do not easily con-
form to science, however understood, makes it clear that I perceive pro-
found problems with the claims for compatibility. The most significant of
those problems is that in order for Buddhism to be somehow compatible
with science, much of Buddhism must be sacrificed.
The problem is that in order for me to make, or even imply, such a
claim, I must know what “Buddhism” is. But in recent decades, scholars of
Buddhism have been reluctant even to render that noun in the singular,
speaking instead of “Buddhisms” in an effort to reflect the wide range of
doctrine and practice across time and space. Thus no scholar of Buddhism
would dare attempt to identify some essence or even defining characteris-
tic of Buddhism, instead offering, when asked, a rather dry historical nar-
rative: “Buddhism is a religious tradition that began in India around the
fifth century B.C.E., founded by a figure known as the Buddha. . . .” No
one, in other words, would dare to venture “what counts as genuine Bud-
dhism,” as Harrison puts it. I also do not dare to do so, but I do raise the
question. It is perhaps a normative question, but it has a historical answer.
For, although no scholar of Buddhism can say what Buddhism should be,
a scholar can say, or at least speculate on the basis of historical evidence,
what Buddhism has been for Buddhists across Asia, extending back over
more than two millennia. And a scholar can say, or at least speculate on the
basis of anthropological evidence, what Buddhism is for Buddhists, across
Asia and elsewhere, during the present generation. It is clear that the Bud-
dhism that is compatible with science must jettison much of what Bud-
dhism has been in order to claim that compatibility.
That loss evokes for me the classical Buddhist doctrine of the degenera-
tion of the dharma, the idea that as more and more time passes since the
time that Buddha entered nirvana, the more difficult it becomes to follow
the path that he set forth. This is a conservative vision, one that remains
ever skeptical of the present moment. But predictions of when that degen-
erate age began vary greatly in Buddhist texts. Some are as short as five
hundred years, meaning that we have been living in the degenerate age for
some time now. As I suggest in the book, the claim that Buddhism is com-
patible with science may be seen as further evidence of that.
There is another way to look at it, however. Some scholars have begun
to refer to a form of Buddhism called “modern Buddhism.” Its origins are
hazy, but most would agree that it has existed since at least the first half of
the nineteenth century. Despite its having endured for some two centu-
ries, not an insubstantial fraction of the entire history of Buddhism, schol-
ars have tended to see modern Buddhism as something of a monolith,
with its own defining doctrines, one of which is the compatibility of Bud-
dhism and science. In my book I call this compatibility into question by
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noting that different, and often mutually contradictory, scientific theories
are called upon to be compatible with Buddhism. But it may be that mod-
ern Buddhism has existed long enough to require its own periodization, in
which each period of modern Buddhism has its own favored “science.”
Such an approach would transform what I perceived as a problem into a
key element of the modern history of Buddhism, or at least of the history
of modern Buddhism. This suggestion derives not from me but from
Harrison’s response, and I am most grateful to him for it.
RESPONSE TO THUPTEN JINPA
The autobiographical sketch Jinpa provides is too modest. He was trained
as a Buddhist monk in the Tibetan exile community in India, completing
the monastic curriculum and achieving the highest academic degree in the
Geluk sect of Tibetan Buddhism, the rank of geshe. He did this not on the
fast track of the incarnate lama but as an ordinary monk. He went on to
earn a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cambridge. He has served as the Dalai
Lama’s translator for many years and is one of the most learned and skilled
translators of Tibetan Buddhist texts, of all sects. He is an active partici-
pant in the most current conversations on Buddhism and neuroscience.
He and I currently are working together on two large translation projects.
The first is the so-called travel journals of Gendun Chopel, and the second
is the extensive refutation of the doctrines of rebirth and emptiness com-
posed in Tibetan by the early eighteenth-century Jesuit missionary to Ti-
bet, Ippolito Desideri. Jinpa thus is eminently qualified to provide a highly
informed Tibetan perspective on the question of the relation of Buddhism
to science—as a Tibetan, as a Buddhist, as a scholar of Tibetan Buddhism,
and as an active participant in the current dialogue.
Acknowledging the late arrival of Tibetans to the dialogue, his com-
ments focus very much on the current scene. Indeed, I find that he pro-
vides here the single most insightful articulation of what is at stake for
Tibetan Buddhism in the arena of Buddhism and science. These insights
are several. Near the beginning of his essay he makes an important distinc-
tion concerning the backgrounds of the two kinds of Buddhists who par-
ticipate in the dialogue: “traditional Buddhists,” who bring an inherited
Buddhist worldview, and Western Buddhists, who bring an inherited sci-
entific worldview. By this latter group he means academic scientists who
have become Buddhists at some point in their careers. A more detailed
profile of each of these two types of Buddhists might be fruitfully com-
piled, determining which science and which Buddhism initially captured
their imagination, and why.
I argue in my book that claims for the compatibility of Buddhism and
science resulted from the colonial encounter. In the case of Tibet, that
encounter was not with Europe or America but with China. Indeed, Tibet
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lost its independence just as the European colonies were gaining theirs.
The Buddhisms of Sri Lanka, China, and Japan each had to defend them-
selves against the colonialist critique, even though China and Japan never
became European colonies. The Buddhism of Tibet also has defended it-
self more recently in the voice of the Dalai Lama himself. Jinpa notes the
Dalai Lama’s strong interest in introducing Western science into the tradi-
tional monastic curriculum; the Dalai Lama also has expressed his hope
that a Buddhist monk may one day become a famous scientist. His moti-
vations for this hope are certainly many, but one of them is likely a wish to
counter the Chinese claim that Tibetan Buddhism is a form of primitive
superstition (exactly as Christian missionaries claimed about other forms
of Buddhism in the nineteenth century) and to maintain the vitality and
relevance of Buddhism for the modern world, a world that one day may
include a free Tibet.
In describing the Mind and Life dialogues that the Dalai Lama has con-
ducted with scientists since 1987, Jinpa explains that “the metaphysical
dimension—the concepts of rebirth, karma, and the possibility of full en-
lightenment of Buddhism; and physicalism, reductionism, the causal clo-
sure principle on the part of the scientific worldview” are left bracketed (p.
876). Yet karma, rebirth, and the possibility of full enlightenment are among
the most important foundations of Buddhist thought and practice. Physi-
calism, reductionism, and the causal closure principle also are highly im-
portant, especially in neuroscience. These are precisely the topics that must
be unbracketed and confronted in any discussion of Buddhism and sci-
ence. It is also among these topics that the most intractable disagreements
likely lie. Buddhism is a dualistic system in which mind and matter are
different in essential ways, with moments of mind able to be produced
only from previous moments of mind; the Buddhist claim that a moment
of consciousness can be produced only by a prior moment of conscious-
ness is central to the Buddhist argument in support of rebirth. Such a
position would seem entirely at odds with “the widely assumed regulative
principle in cognitive science that mind equals brain and that all mental
states are, in the final analysis, merely brain states” to which Jinpa refers (p.
878).
Jinpa notes that in some cases the Dalai Lama has been willing to aban-
don a particular Buddhist doctrine that has been shown to be empirically
false, such as the existence of Mount Meru. He also suggests that on the
question of the “origin of human life on earth . . . traditional sources [are]
being replaced by the Darwinian theory of evolution” (pp. 877–78). This
substitution seems a great deal more difficult, especially given the critique
of Darwin offered by the Dalai Lama in The Universe in a Single Atom, one
that I discuss in my book.
Jinpa notes the most important “challenges being posed by the scientific
worldview to key Buddhist concepts” (p. 878), such as karma and rebirth,
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and goes on to observe that historically many of the fundamental tenets of
Buddhist thought developed from dialogue with non-Buddhist philoso-
phers. Indeed, scholars have been able to identify a number of Buddhist
doctrines and practices borrowed, sometimes with only the slightest revi-
sion, from Hinduism and Jainism. Such borrowings have not been ac-
knowledged by the tradition but rather claimed as its own. Further, the
biographies of the great Buddhist philosophers of India are filled with ac-
counts of their debates with non-Buddhist, usually Hindu, philosophers.
In these accounts, the Buddhists always eventually win. Yet, by the four-
teenth century, Buddhism had disappeared from India.
There is only one historical point where I disagree with Jinpa. This is
the statement that in Buddhism, “For once, science is encountering an
intellectual tradition that traces its lineage back to more than two thou-
sand years of inquiry yet has a history very different from the West” (p.
881). In fact, European scholars encountered the Hindu tradition first. At
the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was an enthusiasm for what
Europe might learn from Hindu culture not unlike the enthusiasm for
Buddhism two centuries hence. That enthusiasm for Hinduism faded af-
ter India became a colony of the British, and Buddhism took its place as
the most worthy of the non-Christian religions, a Buddhism largely cre-
ated in Europe, as I demonstrate in my book. And two decades ago, at least
in certain circles, there was enthusiasm for the scientific measure of medi-
tation similar to that which exists today. However, it was not Buddhist
meditation but Transcendental Meditation, a practice derived, regardless
of its claims, from Hinduism. The research conducted on TM, typically by
TM practitioners, has since been discredited. But does the fault lie with
the methodology or the tradition of the practice?
As one of the central interlocutors in conversations on the emerging
field of “contemplative science,” Jinpa is to be applauded for his cautious
tone as he notes that it is unclear in the current state of research “whether
such a field will have any lasting impact on science as a whole” (pp. 879–
80). He closes his response with the hope that the encounter between Bud-
dhism and science will accomplish the two aims of helping Buddhists to
update their understanding of the physical world and helping science be-
come more human. This hope has a long history, having been stated by
Buddhist figures from a number of nations, dating back to the nineteenth
century. It often has been expressed with the claim that science is better
able to describe the outer world and Buddhism is better able to describe
the inner world, a claim that carries with it many assumptions about Bud-
dhism and about science that deserve further reflection. But this old hope,
expressed in the past, is one that we share for the future.
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CONCLUSION
A recent research program of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (NWO) has the elegant title “The Future of the Religious Past.”
I have baldly appropriated this phrase for the title of these brief comments,
but with a somewhat different meaning. All religions obviously have a past
that figures prominently in their representation, both for the present and
the future. Two questions that I raise in Buddhism and Science: A Guide for
the Perplexed are (1) how much of Buddhism, in a certain sense how much
of the Buddhist past, must be sacrificed in order for it to be compatible
with science, and (2) how much that sacrifice costs. Such questions, as
Harrison observes, can and should be asked in the case of all religions.
However, the past also has a different meaning in Buddhism that is
germane here. With its central doctrines of karma and rebirth, and with its
doctrine of the bodhisattva—the being who perfects himself over billions
of past lives in order to achieve buddhahood for the sake of future genera-
tions—the past shapes the future in specific, and consequential, ways in
Buddhism. Yet, despite the apparently infallible mechanism of karma—a
mechanism, it should be noted, that delighted certain Victorian enthusi-
asts—much of Buddhist practice over the course of more than two millen-
nia has been directed at techniques for negating the past, for circumventing
the law of karma. One thinks of the Chinese Buddhist practice of sending
“spirit money” to the dead in order to bribe the judges of hell. With the
rise of the Mahayana around the beginning of the Common Era, certain
texts declared that all beings would become bodhisattvas, and hence
buddhas; other texts proclaimed that all beings are already buddhas now.
And nirvana itself, the storied goal of the tradition, is in one sense a nega-
tion of the past in order to prevent the future. The past is thus particularly
powerful in Buddhism, and techniques for its subversion, or at least its
radical revisioning, have a long and venerable history.
Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed is a modest plea for this
past. Or perhaps it is three pleas about what Buddhists call “the three times”:
the past, the present, and the future. The first asks us to recall that the
claim that Buddhism and science are compatible is part of the past; it has
already been made many times, for more than a century. The second asks—
in the present rush to proclaim that Buddhism is compatible with sci-
ence—that Buddhism’s long past, and all that it connotes, not be forgotten.
The third asks, in accordance with classical Buddhist doctrine, that we see
the ever bright future of the meeting of Buddhism and science as deter-
mined in important ways by the history of Buddhism, both in Asia and the
West—determined, in other words, by the past.
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